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Too often, innocent individuals sharing the same name and
physical characteristics as the subject of an arrest warrant are
misidentified and mistakenly held by law enforcement. The use of
biometric identifiers, commonly known as fingerprint identification
numbers, would help reduce the number of false arrests because a
person’s fingerprints are entirely unique to that individual. Hearkening
back to 1894, the Supreme Court’s prevailing interpretation of the
particularity requirement of arrest warrants mandates only that the
warrant include a subject’s name or general physical description. With
such a low threshold to establish a facially valid warrant, law
enforcement officers are essentially immunized from civil liability and
mistakenly arrested individuals are without legal recourse. Such
consequences do not accord with the Fourth Amendment’s “right of the
people to be secure in their persons.” This Note argues that biometric
identifiers, which have been used in law enforcement and have the
ability to singularly identify the actual subject of an arrest warrant,
should be included on arrest warrants. This embellishment of the
“particularity” standard faithfully accords with the guarantees of the
Fourth Amendment and would advance the rights of individuals who
are wrongly arrested.
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1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2. West v. Cabell, 153 U.S. 78, 85 (1894) (“[A] warrant for the arrest of a person charged
with a crime must truly name him, or describe him sufficiently to identify him.”).
3. 1890 Fast Facts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/history
/www/through_the_decades/fast_facts/1890_fast_facts.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2012).
4. U.S. and World Population Clock, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/main
/www/popclock.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2013).
5. Dan Frosch, Mistaken Identity Cases at Heart of Denver Lawsuit Over Wrongful Arrests,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2012, at A18.
6. Robert Faturechi & Jack Leonard, ID Errors Put Hundred In County Jail, L.A. TIMES,
Dec. 25, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/dec/25/local/la-me-wrong-id-20111225.
7. Id.
8. See infra Parts III.A–B.
9. See infra Part III.A.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Fourth Amendment guarantees the “right of the people to be
secure in their persons”;1 however, when an individual possesses the
same name or physical description as that listed on an arrest warrant
issued for someone else, that right is no longer secure. In 1894, the
Supreme Court of the United States explained the level of
particularity required for describing the subject of an arrest warrant:
the warrant must include the subject’s name, or if unknown, a
description sufficiently identifying the subject.2 Since the Court set
this standard, our population has grown from roughly 63 million
citizens in 18943 to over 316 million citizens today,4 empirically
increasing the probability that two individuals share the same name
and physical description.
From 2002 to 2009, the city of Denver, Colorado, recorded over
five hundred cases of wrongful incarceration where law enforcement
was armed with a legally valid arrest warrant but erred and arrested
the wrong person.5 From 2006 to 2011, the Los Angeles Sheriff’s
Department recorded more than 1,480 wrongful incarcerations, many
of which were executed pursuant to a valid warrant.6 Despite being
mistakenly arrested and detained for days and weeks on end,7 these
individuals are often left with no viable path toward judicial relief.8
So long as the arresting officer executed a facially valid arrest
warrant, courts will generally defer to the good-faith discretion of
law enforcement and hold that a reasonable mistake immunizes the
government agency from civil rights liability.9
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As these cases illustrate, many innocent individuals may share
the same name and physical characteristics listed on a valid arrest
warrant; however, no two individuals possess identical fingerprints.10
Historically, prisons similarly classified and identified arrestees
solely by their names and physical measurements.11 After a Kansas
federal prison discovered that two arrestees shared the same name
and physical measurements,12 prisons across the country abolished
the system and began using fingerprinting as the primary means of
identification during an arrest.13 Today, federal and state law
enforcement use fingerprint identification numbers (“biometric
identifiers”) to classify and identify arrested individuals.14 Each time
a person is booked and arrested, a unique biometric identifier is
assigned to that individual, thereby distinguishing him or her from all
other arrestees.15
Although the evolution from names and physical measurements
toward biometric identifiers has proven to be an efficient and
effective improvement on the process of classifying arrestees,16 the
Supreme Court maintains that a name or physical description is
sufficient to identify the subject of an arrest warrant.17 Until this
standard is broadened to include biometric identifiers, innocent
people will continue to be wrongfully incarcerated without any hope
of judicial relief.

09/23/2014 13:40:53
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10. Biometric Authentication: What Method Works Best?, TECHNOVELGY.COM,
http://www.technovelgy.com/ct/technology-article.asp?artnum=16 (last visited Sept. 21, 2013).
“In over 140 years of fingerprint comparison worldwide, no two fingerprints have ever been
found to be alike, not even those of identical twins.” Id.
11. See G. Larry Mays et al., Review Essay: DNA (Deoxyribonucleic Acid) Evidence,
Criminal Law, and Felony Prosecution: Issues and Prospects, 16 JUST. SYS. J. 111, 112 (1992).
The “Bertillon method” founded by the French police officer Alphonse Bertillon, involved
measurements of an individual’s head and body, combined with photographs, physical
descriptions, and other identifying marks, to create a catalogue for identifying multiple offenders.
Id.
12. History of Fingerprints, CRIME SCENE FORENSICS, LLC, http://www.crimescene
-forensics.com/History_of_Fingerprints.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2013).
13. See Mays et al., supra note 11, at 112.
14. See infra Part III.C (discussing the FBI’s implementation of the Integrated Automated
Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS)).
15. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SURVEY OF STATE CRIMINAL
HISTORY INFORMATION SYSTEMS, 2010, at viii (2011) [hereinafter DOJ SURVEY].
16. Biometric Authentication: What Method Works Best?, supra note 10.
17. See West v. Cabell, 153 U.S. 78, 85 (1894).

35551-lla_47-1 Sheet No. 168 Side A

09/23/2014 13:40:53

WHAT’S IN A NAME

Fall 2013]

9/7/2014 6:48 PM

WHAT’S IN A NAME?

323

Part II of this Note examines current arrest warrant procedure,
traces evolving Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, and frames the
warrant particularity issue through two recent federal court decisions
regarding the use of biometric identifiers on arrest warrants. Part III
first analyzes the existing paths toward judicial relief available to
wrongfully incarcerated individuals, and then discusses the
integration of fingerprinting and biometric identifiers in current
federal and state law enforcement procedures. Part IV details the
effects that the use of biometric identifiers would have on arrest
warrant procedures and, ultimately, proposes that the Supreme Court
interpret the Fourth Amendment’s warrant particularity requirement
to include the use of numerical biometric identifiers capable of
singularly identifying an arrest warrant’s actual subject on all
existing and future arrest warrants.
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18. While the clause refers to both arrest and search warrants, this Note focuses solely on its
application to arrest warrants. Unlike a search warrant, which gives authority to search an
individual’s residence, an arrest warrant “command[s] the arrest of a designated person, such
person to be brought before a court or magistrate to answer specified charges.” RONALD L.
CARLSON, CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCEDURE § 2.1 (7th ed. 2005).
19. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
20. CARLSON, supra note 18, § 2.1.
21. See id.; THOMAS K. CLANCY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ITS HISTORY AND
INTERPRETATION §§ 12.2.1, 12.5.1 (2008).
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II. BACKGROUND
The Fourth Amendment explicitly requires that “no Warrants18
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.”19 Before an individual can be
lawfully arrested through an arrest warrant pursuant to the Fourth
Amendment, the warrant must be properly issued by a magistrate and
properly executed by a peace officer of the state.20 Both the issuance
and execution of the warrant are subject to separate determinations of
probable cause.21 When individuals assert a violation of the Fourth
Amendment Warrant Clause, they primarily rely on one of two
distinct theories: that the warrant was not properly issued because it
did not describe its subject with particularity, or that the warrant was
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not properly executed because the arresting officer lacked probable
cause for the arrest.22
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22. CLANCY, supra note 21, at §§ 12.2.2, 12.3.1. One can also argue that the officer’s
affidavit submitted to the issuing magistrate lacked indicia of probable cause for proper issuance.
These types of cases are rare. “[T]he only evidence admissible at [such a] hearing is the evidence
submitted to the magistrate who issued the warrant” and, typically, great deference is given to the
magistrate’s determination of probable cause. Id. §§ 12.3.1–12.3.2.
23. CARLSON, supra note 18, § 2.1.
24. 361 U.S. 98 (1959).
25. Id. at 102.
26. CARLSON, supra note 18, § 2.1; see also Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481–
82 (1963) (“The arrest warrant procedure serves to insure that the deliberate, impartial judgment
of a judicial officer will be interposed between the citizen and the police, to assess the weight and
credibility of the information which the complaining officer adduces as probable cause.”).
27. CARLSON, supra note 18, § 2.1.
28. FED. R. CRIM. P. 4(b)(1)(a)–(d).

35551-lla_47-1 Sheet No. 168 Side B

A. Issuance and Execution of an Arrest Warrant
To satisfy the probable cause requirement, a magistrate or
judicial officer must issue the arrest warrant and can only do so upon
a finding that probable cause justifies the arrest.23 In Henry v. United
States,24 the Supreme Court observed that probable cause, as
required for the issuance of an arrest warrant, can only exist “if the
facts and circumstances known to the officer warrant a prudent man
in believing that the offense has been committed.”25 Thus, to
establish probable cause, the magistrate must examine the peace
officer’s complaint, given under oath, and “carefully review any
written application or affidavits supporting the request for an arrest
warrant.”26 In this way, establishing probable cause largely depends
on satisfaction of the Clause’s second requirement, that it be
supported by “Oath or affirmation,” for a magistrate will not issue
the warrant unless the officer affirms that the facts giving rise to the
warrant’s necessity are true.27 Finally, for a warrant to be validly
issued, it must satisfy the particularity requirement by including: (1)
the defendant’s name or a description by which the defendant can be
identified with reasonable certainty; (2) a description of the offense
charged in the complaint; (3) a command that the defendant be
arrested and brought without unnecessary delay before a magistrate
judge or, if none is reasonably available, before a state or local
judicial officer; and (4) a judge’s signature.28
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When executing the warrant, the arresting police officer need
not have a copy of the warrant in his or her possession to make a
valid arrest.29 For instance, when an officer conducts a traffic stop
and runs a background check on the driver, the officer can access the
Sheriff’s Data Network and other criminal databases through the
patrol car laptop, or call a law enforcement agency and have an
official convey the warrant’s description telephonically.30 The officer
executing the warrant then must make an objective probable cause
determination that the subject of the warrant matches the arrestee.31
The arresting officer’s determination should be based on the “totality
of the circumstances” and whether there is a “reasonable belief” that
the arrestee is, in fact, the person named in the warrant.32 This
determination of probable cause at the time of execution and the
particularity of the warrant’s description upon issuance provide
courts the dual framework for assessing a violation of the Fourth
Amendment’s warrant requirement.33
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29. NANCY YUENGER ET AL., CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE
§ 4.7 (2012).
30. See New Mobile Computers in LA Sheriff’s Patrol Cars Increase Public Safety Through
Advanced Technology, LACOUNTY.GOV, http://sheriff.lacounty.gov/wps/portal/lasd/media/detail
/?current=true&urile=wcm:path:/lasd+content/lasd+site/home/home+top+stories/new+mobile+co
mputers+in+la+sheriffs+patrol+cars+increase+public+safety+through+advanced+technology
(last visited Sept. 21, 2013).
31. YUENGER ET AL., supra note 29, § 4.5.
32. Hill v. Scott, 349 F.3d 1068, 1072–73 (8th Cir. 2003).
33. CLANCY, supra note 21, §§ 12.2.2, 12.3.1.
34. 153 U.S. 78 (1894).
35. Id. at 78.
36. Id. at 78–79.
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B. Evolving Jurisprudence on the Fourth Amendment’s
Warrant Particularity Requirement
The Supreme Court first evaluated the scope of the Fourth
Amendment’s particularity requirement in West v. Cabell.34 In West,
U.S. Marshall William Cabell arrested Vandy M. West on a charge
of murder.35 The warrant under which West was arrested, however,
named the subject as “James West” and did not contain any other
description.36 Before trial, West requested that the jury be instructed
that a warrant for the arrest of James West could not authorize his
arrest even if he was the intended party because the warrant
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37. Id. at 80.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 85.
40. Id. at 87–88.
41. See Rivera v. County of Los Angeles, No. CV 10-1861, 2011 WL 2650006, at *8–10
(C.D. Cal. July 5, 2011).
42. See Cynthia Lee, Reasonableness with Teeth: The Future of Fourth Amendment
Reasonableness Analysis, 81 MISS. L.J. 1133, 1147–48 (2012); Melanie Schoenfeld,
Constitutional Amnesia: Judicial Validation of Probable Cause for Arresting the Wrong Person
on a Facially Valid Warrant, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 1227, 1239–40, 1250–51 (2001).
43. 401 U.S. 797 (1971).
44. Id. at 802–05.
45. Id. at 797–98.
46. Id. at 798–99.
47. Id.

35551-lla_47-1 Sheet No. 169 Side B

incorrectly named the intended subject.37 The lower court disagreed
and refused to grant West’s request.38
The Supreme Court subsequently overturned the lower court’s
ruling and decided, “a warrant for the arrest of a person charged with
a crime must truly name him, or describe him sufficiently to identify
him.”39 Applying this standard, the Court then found the warrant to
be defective because it contained neither West’s correct name nor a
description of him.40 The Court’s interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment’s particularity requirement, as set forth in West, remains
the standard by which an arrest warrant is determined to be facially
valid.41
Since West, the Court has refused to address the constitutionality
of the particularity standard, focusing instead on the reasonableness
of warrant execution and the existence of probable cause despite
reasonable mistakes in matching the warrant to the arrestee.42
In Hill v. California,43 the Supreme Court granted certiorari to
determine whether an arrest based on mistaken identity, but executed
pursuant to a valid warrant, violated the Fourth Amendment.44 The
case primarily revolved around an armed robbery that occurred in
Studio City, California.45 The day after the robbery occurred, police
officers arrested two men for possession of narcotics and, upon
investigation of their car, found stolen property linking the men to
the robbery.46 The two men told the officers the car belonged to
Archie Hill and implicated Hill as one of the bank robbers.47
After checking Hill’s arrest record and verifying that his age and
physical characteristics matched the descriptions given by the two
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men and the robbery victims, the officers went to Hill’s address.48
When the officers arrived at Hill’s residence, a man named Miller
answered the door; he stated that he was not Hill and knew nothing
about the stolen property.49 However, because Miller matched the
physical description for Hill, the officers arrested Miller and seized
the stolen property they found in the home incident to Miller’s
arrest.50
Hill was subsequently arrested and charged with robbery.51 At
the preliminary hearing before Hill’s trial, Hill argued that Miller’s
arrest was invalid under the Fourth Amendment and that any
property seized during the arrest could not legally be used as
evidence against Hill.52 The trial judge sustained the admissibility of
the evidence, finding that “the arresting officers had acted in the
good-faith belief that Miller was in fact Hill.”53 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari and upheld the validity of both Miller’s arrest and
the subsequent search of Hill’s home.54 The Court held that as long
as the police have probable cause to arrest one person, the
subsequent arrest of the wrong person based on a reasonable mistake
in identifying the subject is constitutionally valid.55 The Court
clarified that “sufficient probability, not certainty, is the touchstone
of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment.”56
Numerous lower courts have since expanded the notion of
“reasonableness” in similar cases of mistaken identity arrests based
on a facially valid warrant.57 In Hill v. Scott,58 Brian Arthur Hill, an

09/23/2014 13:40:53
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48. Id. at 799.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 797, 801–03. The police did not have an arrest or search warrant for Hill or his
apartment. Id. A search incident to an arrest includes the right to search the arrestee’s near
vicinity and is justified by the general right to seize items connected with a crime. See CARLSON,
supra note 18, § 2.2.
51. Hill v. California, 401 U.S. at 799–802.
52. Id. at 801–02.
53. Id. at 801.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 802.
56. Id. at 804.
57. See Brown v. Patterson, 823 F.2d 167, 169 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding an officer was
reasonable to arrest § 1983 plaintiff with the same name and race, but otherwise different
information, as was listed on the warrant); Johnson v. Miller, 680 F.2d 39, 41–42 (7th Cir. 1982)
(concluding police officer’s misidentification arrest of a white woman pursuant to an arrest
warrant for a black woman did not violate the Constitution).
58. 349 F.3d 1068 (8th Cir. 2003).
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59. Id. at 1072.
60. Id. at 1070.
61. In 1995, Hill sued Officer Scott and other officers for wrongful arrest and excessive
force, and defendants settled on the eve of trial. The events at issue in this case occurred less than
a year after the settlement. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1071.
65. Id. at 1070–71.
66. Id. at 1074.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1073–74.
69. See id. at 1072.

35551-lla_47-1 Sheet No. 170 Side B

African-American, was arrested under a warrant issued for a
different Brian Hill, even though the warrant specified a different
middle name, birth date, and eye color.59 Before his arrest, Hill
called the police to report his disabled parking permit had been
stolen.60 Three officers arrived on the scene, and Officer Scott, who
recognized Hill,61 called and asked a dispatcher to conduct a warrant
check on a “Brian Hill.”62 The dispatcher replied that there was an
outstanding warrant issued for a “Brian Walter Hill . . . who was
5’11” and 175 pounds with green eyes.”63 Believing the warrant was
for the Hill he recognized, Officer Scott told the other officers to
execute the warrant.64 When Hill protested that he was not the person
on the warrant, a confrontation arose between Hill and the arresting
officers, which required Hill to be immediately hospitalized.65
Despite Hill’s insistence that Officer Scott should have investigated
his middle name, date of birth, and eye color before executing the
arrest, the court nonetheless held that Hill could not assert a violation
of his Fourth Amendment rights.66 Once the court determined the
warrant was facially valid, it held that “[Officer] Scott had sufficient
consistent identifying information to reasonably conclude the
warrant was for appellant Hill and no reasonable officer would have
known failing to investigate further would violate the Fourth
Amendment.”67
While the court acknowledged that further investigation would
have confirmed Brian Hill was innocent,68 it was bound by Hill v.
California’s holding that a “mistaken arrest based on a facially valid
warrant does not violate the Fourth Amendment if the officers
reasonably mistook the arrestee for the person named in the
warrant.”69 Thus, as Hill v. Scott shows, even where height, weight,
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and eye color differ, the court will defer to the officer’s good-faith
determination of probable cause.70
As courts like the one in Hill v. Scott continue to broaden the
standard of reasonableness by which an officer may obtain probable
cause to execute an arrest warrant against an innocent individual,71
other lower courts have questioned whether a name or physical
description remains the most reasonable form of warrant
identification in light of the growing number of wrongful
incarcerations.72
C. Biometric Identifiers and the Fourth Amendment’s
Particularity Requirement
The following California federal district court cases involve two
of the more than 1,480 wrongful incarcerations that took place in Los
Angeles, California, from 2006 to 2011.73 In both cases, the arrest
warrants satisfied the particularity standard set down in West, but
failed to include biometric identifiers readily available to Los
Angeles law enforcement officials.74
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70. See id. at 1073–74.
71. See id. at 1075–76 (Heaney, J., dissenting); see Lee, supra note 42, at 1142–43.
72. See infra Part II.C.
73. Smith v. County of Los Angeles, No. CV 11-10666 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 11, 2012); Rivera v.
County of Los Angeles, No. CV 10-1861, 2011 WL 2650006 (C.D. Cal. July 5, 2011); Faturechi
& Leonard, supra note 6.
74. Smith, No. CV 11-10666, slip op. at 4, 12; Rivera, 2011 WL 2650006, at *6, *8–10, *13.
75. No. CV 10-1861, 2011 WL 2650006 (C.D. Cal. July 5, 2011).
76. Id. at *2; CAL. VEH. CODE § 25153(a)–(b) (West 2013) (criminalizing driving under the
influence and causing injury).
77. Rivera, 2011 WL 2650006, at *3.
78. Id. at *2.

35551-lla_47-1 Sheet No. 171 Side A

1. Rivera v. County of Los Angeles75
On July 12, 1985, a Los Angeles Superior Court issued an arrest
warrant for an individual named Santiago Rivera on charges of
felony manslaughter and violations of California Vehicle Code
sections 23153(a) and 23153(b).76 The warrant contained the name
“Santiago Rivera,” a birth date, and a description that the subject was
a Hispanic male with brown hair, brown eyes, a height of five feet
five inches, and a weight of 180 pounds.77 On June 18, 1989,
Montclair police arrested a Santiago Iberra Rivera (“Rivera”) on the
mistaken belief that he was the warrant’s actual subject.78 Although
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Id. at *3, *8–9.
Id. at *2.
Id.
See id.
Id. at *3.
Id.
Id. at *34.
Id. at *4.
Id. at *1.
Id. at *1, *6.

09/23/2014 13:40:53

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
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this Rivera was one inch taller and ten pounds lighter than the
warrant’s description stated,79 the arresting officers maintained that
this Rivera matched the description and proceeded to book him in the
San Bernardino detention center.80 Rivera was not released until nine
days later when a fingerprint comparison revealed that he was not the
actual subject.81 Without making any changes to the warrant’s
description, the police reissued the warrant just a few days following
Rivera’s release.82
Then on March 7, 2009, almost twenty years after his wrongful
arrest, Rivera was riding in a car in San Bernardino, California, when
police stopped the vehicle for missing a license plate.83 An officer
ran a record check against Rivera’s name and pulled up the arrest
warrant for the other Santiago Rivera.84 Despite Rivera’s protests
that he was mistakenly arrested on the same warrant twenty years
earlier, Rivera was booked in the local detention center for two days,
and then transferred to the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department.85 Due
to the seriousness of the charges in the warrant and the court’s
inability to locate the fingerprint file of the true subject, Rivera
remained in custody for thirty-three days until a fingerprint
comparison revealed he was not the actual subject.86
Following his second faulty arrest, Rivera brought suit against
Los Angeles and San Bernardino Counties asserting civil rights
claims under § 1983 for violation of his Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights.87 Rivera claimed that in both incidents, the
warrant did not satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s particularity
requirement.88 Specifically, he argued that his Fourth Amendment
rights were violated because the warrant failed to contain the actual
subject’s biometric identification number when it was originally
issued in 1985 and subsequently failed to include either his or the
actual suspect’s biometric identification number upon the warrant’s
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reissuance in 1989.89 The court cited West and held not only that the
descriptions in both warrants contained more information than
legally required, but that both sets of arresting officers were
reasonable in their beliefs that Rivera was the intended subject of the
warrants.90
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89. Id. at *6.
90. Id. at *8–10.
91. No. CV 11-10666 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 11, 2012).
92. On January 22, 2000, the Judges of the Municipal and Superior Courts voted to merge
into the Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles. Historical Perspective, LOS
ANGELES
SUPERIOR
COURT
http://www.lasuperiorcourt.orghttp://www.lasuperiorcourt.orghttp://www.lasuperiorcourt.org/abo
utcourt/ui/history.aspx (last visited Sept. 21, 2013).
93. Smith, No. CV 11-10666, slip op. at 4.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. The basis for his release is unclear. The case simply states “the Superior Court
ordered [Smith’s] release from jail on the basis that he was not the subject of the warrant.” Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
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2. Smith v. County of Los Angeles91
In 1991, the Los Angeles Municipal Court92 issued a felony
arrest warrant for a Reggie Lamar Smith for failing to appear for
sentencing on a felony sexual battery charge.93 Although law
enforcement had the suspect’s fingerprint identification numbers at
the time the warrant was issued,94 the warrant only identified the
suspect by first and last name, date of birth, ethnicity, sex, height,
weight, eye color, and hair color.95
On July 25, 2007, Reginald Lenard Smith (“Smith”) was pulled
over for a traffic violation in Antioch, Tennessee.96 The arresting
officer searched his name and discovered the 1991 warrant, which
matched Smith’s information and description.97 Smith was
subsequently arrested and extradited to California where he was
incarcerated for thirteen days.98 After his release, the Los Angeles
Superior Court reissued the warrant with the same name and
description and without any information clearing Smith as the
intended subject.99 Four years later, on January 27, 2011, Smith was
arrested again on the belief he was the Reggie Lamar Smith
described in the warrant.100
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III. ANALYSIS
The wrongful incarcerations of Santiago Rivera, Reginald
Smith, and thousands of others106 clearly demonstrate the need for
broadening the particularity standard in West to include biometric
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Y K

09/23/2014 13:40:53

101. Id. at 4–5, 10 (referring to Gant v. County of Los Angeles, No. CV 08-05756, 2011 WL
1585133 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 8, 2009) where Smith was a plaintiff and the court dismissed all of
Smith’s claims).
102. Id. at 4–5.
103. Id. at 12.
104. Id. at 11–12 (citations omitted) (quoting Gant, 2011 WL 1585133, at *17 (quoting Powe
v. City of Chicago, 664 F.2d 639, 647 (7th Cir. 1981))).
105. Id. at 12.
106. See Frosch, supra note 5; see Faturechi & Leonard, supra note 6.
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After both of his arrests, in 2007 and 2011, Smith brought civil
rights claims against the county of Los Angeles for violations of his
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.101 Regarding his second
arrest, Smith argued that the warrant did not meet the particularity
requirement by failing to contain the true suspect’s biometric
identifier, Smith’s biometric identifier, or a statement exonerating
Smith as the intended subject.102 Responding to the County’s motion
to dismiss, the court dismissed Smith’s Fourth Amendment claim
with prejudice.103 In reaching its decision, the court explained:
In short, the Fourth Amendment does not require additional
information regarding the subject of an arrest warrant when
the warrant correctly names the subject. Only when “the
authorities do not know, or are uncertain of the intended
arrestee’s name” must officers “give[] some other
description of the intended arrestee that is sufficient to
identify him.”104
However, contrary to its holding, the court acknowledged a
deficiency in the law stating:
It appears clear that requiring the use of biometric
identifiers would not be at all burdensome and would
provide a more precise description of the person sought
than traditional identifiers. However, controlling
jurisprudence, which this Court is . . . bound to follow, does
not require the use of biometric identifiers regardless of
burden.105
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identifiers. Without such a change, the rights of mistakenly arrested
individuals to some form of relief will continue to be curbed by the
entrenched judicial deference to the discretion of law enforcement in
civil rights cases.
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107. See supra Part II.B.
108. Id.
109. Hill v. Scott, 349 F.3d 1068, 1071–72 (8th Cir. 2003).
110. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
111. Id. at 818.
112. Luke Klinker, Hill v. Scott: The Eighth Circuit Upholds the Basic Principles of the
Objective Reasonableness Standard in a Case of Mistaken Identity Arrest, 38 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 691, 691 (2004–2005).
113. See Scott, 349 F.3d at 1072–73. Despite the fact that Hill was an African American and
the warrant described the subject as having green eyes, “the first and last names were identical,
the two Brian Hills [were] only two years apart in age, and there was only one inch difference in
height and twenty-five pounds difference in weight.” Id. at 1072.
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A. The Presumption of Qualified Immunity in
Determining Probable Cause
As the precedent above shows, asserting a violation of the
Fourth Amendment’s Warrant Clause must rest on a theory either
that the warrant was invalid or that the arresting officer lacked
probable cause.107 Thus, individuals mistakenly arrested on a warrant
that is valid under West must argue that the arresting officer lacked
probable cause for arrest.108
In situations where an officer wrongfully arrests an individual
pursuant to a facially valid warrant, the law enforcement agency is
entitled to a defense of qualified immunity.109 The Supreme Court of
the United States defined the modern test for qualified immunity in
Harlow v. Fitzgerald.110 In Harlow, the Court determined,
“government officials performing discretionary functions generally
are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct
does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights
of which a reasonable person would have known.”111 In the context
of wrongful incarceration, federal courts have interpreted Harlow to
mean that “a mistaken arrest based on a facially valid warrant does
not violate the Fourth Amendment if the officers reasonably mistook
the arrestee for the person named in the warrant.”112 Hill v. Scott
demonstrates that an arresting officer need not investigate any further
once some reasonable basis for arrest exists at the time of the
warrant’s execution.113 In fact, some courts seem willing to accept
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the officer’s good-faith reliance on the validity of the warrant alone
as a bar to recovery.114 Ultimately, as long as the arresting officer
was not presented with contradictory information before making the
arrest, a court will find a sufficient basis for probable cause and bar
recovery under the Fourth Amendment.115
B. Turning to the Fourteenth Amendment for Relief
Given the difficulty of obtaining relief under the Fourth
Amendment, victims of mistaken identity arrests will often also
assert civil rights violations of their Fourteenth Amendment due
process rights116 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.117 The Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause protects individuals against
deprivations of liberty without due process of law.118 It is widely
held “that an individual has a liberty interest in being free from
incarceration absent a criminal conviction.”119 To bring a § 1983
cause of action against a state or municipal officer, the plaintiff
must establish that (1) he was “deprived of his
constitutional rights by defendants and their employees
acting under color of state law;” (2) that the defendants
have customs or policies which “amount[] to deliberate
indifference” to their constitutional rights; and (3) that these
policies are the “moving force behind the constitutional
violation[s].”120
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114. Wise v. City of Philadelphia, No. CIV. A. 97-2651, 1998 WL 464918, at *2–3 (E.D. Pa.
July 31, 1998) (finding that the arresting officers reasonably relied on an invalid bench warrant);
St. Fort v. Grinnel, No. 95-C-2295, 1995 WL 632274, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 26, 1995) (“An officer
acting upon a facially valid warrant possesses probable cause to arrest.”).
115. See Scott, 349 F.3d at 1072.
116. See Smith v. County of Los Angeles, No. CV 11-10666, slip op. at 7–9 (C.D. Cal.
Sept. 11, 2012); Rivera v. County of Los Angeles, No. CV 10-1861, 2011 WL 2650006, at *10–
17 (C.D. Cal. July 5, 2011).
117. The Supreme Court has stated that “section [1983] is not itself a source of substantive
rights, but a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred by those parts of the
United States Constitution and federal statutes that it describes.” Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S.
137, 144 n.3 (1979).
118. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
119. Rivera, 2011 WL 2650006, at *9.
120. Id. at *6 (quoting Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 681–82 (9th Cir. 2001)); see
also 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) (stating that any citizen deprived of his or her rights by a state or
municipal officer acting under color of statute, ordinance or custom may seek redress in a civil
action).
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In Rivera, plaintiff Rivera asserted § 1983 due process violations
resting on two different theories.121 Rivera first claimed that
defendants deprived him of due process by detaining him in spite of
readily available information that he was not the intended subject.122
Rivera then claimed that defendants deprived him of due process by
failing to update the warrant database to reflect that he had been
cleared as the warrant’s subject following his first arrest.123
The court, relying on Baker v. McCollan124 and Lee v. City of
Los Angeles,125 framed Rivera’s first argument to be an issue of
whether the Los Angeles County defendants “were constitutionally
obligated to go beyond the paperwork . . . and independently verify
that Plaintiff was, in fact, the subject of the warrant.”126 The court
rejected this argument, reiterating what it believed to be a commonsense principle: that “a jailer should not be expected to go behind a
court order of commitment to determine whether a person presented
for safekeeping has been convicted as a result of some denial of his
constitutional rights.”127

09/23/2014 13:40:53
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121. Rivera asserted an additional theory that his Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated
because defendant Los Angeles County failed to independently verify his identity. Rivera, 2011
WL 2650006, at *10, *14–15. This theory is not addressed in the opinion because the Court’s
ruling relied on the same rationale as its ruling on Rivera’s first argument: that Defendants were
not required to independently investigate Rivera’s identity or Rivera’s innocence. See id. at *12,
*14–15.
122. Id. at *11–13.
123. Id. at *13–14.
124. 443 U.S. 137 (1979). Baker involved a situation where an arrest warrant was issued
against the wanted subject’s brother after the subject furnished a duplicate of his brother’s
identification during a prior arrest. Id. at 140–41. When local police attempted to execute the
warrant, they arrested the wrong brother, who, in spite of repeated protests of innocence, was
detained in county jail for three days before the discrepancy was discovered. Id. at 141. In
determining whether he was deprived of due process, the Court noted that “depending on what
procedures the State affords defendants following arrest and prior to actual trial, mere detention
pursuant to a valid warrant but in the face of repeated protests of innocence will after the lapse of
a certain amount of time deprive the accused of liberty . . . without due process of law.” Id. at
145–46. Nonetheless, the court held that “a sheriff executing an arrest warrant is [not] required by
the Constitution to investigate independently every claim of innocence,” and found the three-day
detention did not amount to a deprivation without due process of law. Id.
125. 250 F.3d 668 (9th Cir. 2001). “A detainee’s loss of liberty gives rise to a due process
claim under Baker at the point when detaining officials know or should know that the detainee is
entitled to release.” Rivera, 2011 WL 2650006, at *11.
126. Rivera, 2011 WL 2650006, at *10–11.
127. Id. at *12 (quoting Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Rhodes, 403 F.2d 2, 7 (10th Cir.
1968)).
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128. Id. at *13.
129. The test requires that the court balance: (1) the private interest affected by the official
action; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation and the probable value of additional safeguards; and
(3) the governmental interest, including the fiscal and administrative burdens of additional
procedures. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976).
130. 424 U.S. 319.
131. Rivera, 2011 WL 2650006, at *13 (finding that the relatively uncommon nature of the
case made the risk of error slight, and that Rivera’s interest in being free from incarceration
outweighed the government’s burden to update its database when an individual is exonerated on
the basis of mistaken identity).
132. The second and third prongs state that the plaintiff must prove that “the governmental
entity has customs or policies which amount to a deliberate indifference to constitutional rights,”
and that these “policies are the moving force behind the constitutional violations.” Id. at *14.
133. Id. at *14 (citing Christie v. Iopa, 176 F.3d 1231, 1235 (9th Cir. 1999)).
134. Id.
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Rivera’s second argument asserted that defendants should have
updated the warrant database with information clearing him as the
subject following his first arrest, and that the failure to do so was a
violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights.128 To determine
whether due process requires a governmental entity to engage in such
a procedure, the court applied the three-part balancing test129
established in Mathews v. Eldridge.130 The court balanced the risk of
error in light of Rivera’s interest against the government’s interest
and found that “the Due Process Clause does require a custodial
agency to update a re-issued warrant to include information
regarding an individual’s exoneration on the basis of mistaken
identity.”131
Nonetheless, the court concluded that Rivera could not prevail
on his second due process claim for failure to satisfy the second and
third prongs of the § 1983 statute.132 Specifically, the court found
that Rivera did not present evidence that the failure to update the
warrant database was a custom or practice of “deliberate
indifference,” relying on the argument that “a single constitutional
deprivation ordinarily is insufficient to establish a longstanding
practice or custom.”133
As Rivera illustrates, recovery under the Fourteenth Amendment
requires not only proof of a due process violation, but also a showing
that the government agency’s behavior is the result of a custom of
“deliberate indifference.”134 Yet, applying a “deliberate indifference”
standard imposes a level of subjectivity that makes it nearly
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impossible to obtain relief under § 1983.135 Under this standard,
wrongfully incarcerated individuals must not only obtain records
from a government database to prove custom, but also prove that the
agency subjectively chose to ignore their due process rights.136 Thus,
individuals mistakenly arrested and detained pursuant to a valid
warrant are faced with a high probability of no relief.137
C. Fingerprint Technology and Biometric Identifiers
Given the difficulty for mistaken identity victims to obtain relief
pursuant to a Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment violation, revising
the particularity standard to include biometric identifiers presents an
alternative remedy.
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135. See DeAnna Pratt Swearingen, Innocent Until Arrested?: Deliberate Indifference
Toward Detainees’ Due Process Rights, 62 ARK. L. REV. 101, 117–19 (2009).
136. See id.
137. See Schoenfeld, supra note 42, at 1250–51.
138. Fingerprinting has been embedded in the criminal justice system for over 100 years and
has never failed as a means of personal identification. History of Fingerprints, supra note 12. “No
two fingerprints have ever been found to be alike, not even those of identical twins.” Biometric
Authentication: What Method Works Best?, supra note 10.
139. History of Fingerprints, supra note 12.
140. Bertillon System of Criminal Identification, NAT’L L. ENFORCEMENT MUSEUM INSIDER,
http://www.nleomf.org/museum/news/newsletters/online-insider/november-2011/bertillonsystem-criminal-identification.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2013).
141. History of Fingerprints, supra note 12.
142. Id.
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1. Integration of Fingerprinting in Law Enforcement
In 1903, a federal prison in Leavenworth, Kansas, helped change
the way the American criminal justice system classifies and
identifies arrested individuals.138 Prior to 1903, prisons classified
arrestees using Bertillon measurements139 and numerical
measurements of a person’s face and body parts.140 When a man
named Will West was arrested and booked into the Leavenworth
prison system, prison officials photographed his face and took his
Bertillon measurements.141 Upon completion of the booking,
officials discovered that another inmate, William West, had the same
Bertillon measurements and bore a striking resemblance to Will
West.142 The incident called into question the reliability of Bertillon
measurements and ultimately led Leavenworth to become the first
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American penitentiary system to install a fingerprint system in
1904.143
Shortly after Leavenworth, the Second Circuit examined the
need for an improved identification system in United States v.
Kelly,144 a case deciding whether fingerprinting should become a
routine part of the New York state booking process.145 The court
ruled to adopt fingerprinting, finding “no ground in reason or
authority for interfering with a method of identifying persons
charged with crime which has now become widely known. . . .”146
2. Fingerprints in the Digital Era
Just a few years ago, completing an arrestee’s fingerprint check
could take up to three months, “because fingerprint cards had to be
physically transported and processed.”147 However in 1999, the FBI
implemented the Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification
System (IAFIS),148 an automated system for searching fingerprint
files, capable of “distinguish[ing] a single fingerprint from thousands
or even millions of fingerprints previously scanned and stored in
digital form in the computer’s memory.”149 IAFIS maintains the
largest biometric database in the world,150 containing fingerprints,
criminal history files, and associated mug shots for more than
seventy million subjects.151 IAFIS also allows for the interstate
exchange of this information though the Interstate Identification

09/23/2014 13:40:53
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143. MITCHEL P. ROTH, PRISONS AND PRISON SYSTEMS: A GLOBAL ENCYCLOPEDIA 159
(Greenwood Press, 2006).
144. 55 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1932).
145. Id. at 67, 70.
146. Id. at 68. The Second Circuit reversed the district court’s finding that the State lacked
statutory authority to integrate fingerprinting into the booking process. Id. The Court noted that
fingerprinting was “a very certain means [of identification] . . . especially important in a time
when increased population and vast aggregations of people in urban centers have rendered the
notoriety of the individual in the community no longer a ready means of identification.” Id. at 69.
147. All About Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS),
POLICEONE.COM, http://www.policeone.com/police-products/investigation/afis/articles/1802754
-All-About-Integrated-Automated-Fingerprint-Identification-System-IAFIS/ (last visited Sept. 21,
2013).
148. Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System, FBI.GOV, http://www.fbi.gov
/about-us/cjis/fingerprints_biometrics/iafis/iafis (last visited Sept. 21, 2013).
149. DOJ SURVEY, supra note 15, at v.
150. See Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System, supra note 148 (stating that
IAFIS is the largest biometric database in the world).
151. Id.
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152. DOJ SURVEY, supra note 15, at v.
153. Id. at vi.
154. Id.
155. Smith v. County of Los Angeles, No. CV 11-10666, slip op. at 2 (C.D. Cal. Sep. 11,
2012).
156. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.80.060 (1962); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1750 (2004);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 29-11 (2003); GA. CODE ANN. § 35-3-4 (2000); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 673004 (2001); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148-76 (2003); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-390 (2004); W. VA.
CODE § 15-2-24 (2004).
157. Smith, No. CV 11-10666, slip. op. at 2; DOJ SURVEY, supra note 15, at 7.
158. Smith, No. CV 11-10666, slip. op. at 2.
159. Id.
160. See Corey Preston, Faulty Foundations: How the False Analogy to Routine
Fingerprinting Undermines the Argument for Arrestee DNA Sampling, 19 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 475, 485–86 (2010) (arguing that DNA testing would be an inferior method for criminal
identification purposes than current methods of fingerprinting through IAFIS).
161. Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System, supra note 148.
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Index (III).152 As of December 2010, all fifty states and the District
of Columbia participated in III and had access to every other state’s
criminal history files.153
After a set of fingerprints is entered into IAFIS, a biometric
identification number is assigned, matching the individual to his or
her fingerprints.154 Law enforcement agencies primarily use two
identifiers: a State Identification (SID) number, assigned to every
individual booked into a state jail, and an FBI number, assigned to all
persons arrested for a felony in any state.155
Once an individual is arrested and booked into county jail, the
law enforcement agency will fingerprint and photograph the
individual.156 Forty-two states, including California, take fingerprints
using “livescan” technology, which captures an electronic image of
the arrestee’s fingerprints.157 In California, for example, the image is
transmitted to the California Department of Justice (CDOJ), and
within a few minutes, the CDOJ responds with the arrestee’s SID
and/or FBI number and criminal history.158 If there is no match, the
CDOJ assigns new SID and FBI numbers for the arrestee.159
Given the prevalence of fingerprint technology and nationwide
access to IAFIS, many argue that the use of FBI and SID numbers is
the most efficient and effective form of positively identifying an
individual with a criminal history.160 Entering a SID or FBI number
into III pulls up all identifying information linked to that individual,
including his or her name, birth date, race, sex, criminal history, and
associated mug shot.161 Furthermore, patrol cars are gradually being
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outfitted with computer systems linked to IAFIS and III, allowing
deputies to run background checks and pull up a suspect’s mug shot
in a matter of seconds during a patrol stop.162 As federal and state
law enforcement continue to find ways to integrate fingerprint
technology to apprehend criminals, they have yet to effectively apply
it to the prevention of wrongful incarcerations.
IV. PROPOSAL
As a framework for its proposal, this Note attempts to trace two
evolutions: the evolution of the Fourth Amendment’s warrant
requirement and the evolution of fingerprinting into the American
criminal justice system. At each stage, the need to adapt became
apparent, for the status quo was no longer seen as the most
reasonable method of operation toward the efficient resolution of
justice. This Note suggests that the criminal justice system is at yet
another stage, where the use of names and physical descriptions on
arrest warrants can no longer be viewed as the most reasonable
method of identifying an arrest warrant’s subject.
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162. W.J. Hennigan, Sheriff’s Deputies to Get Battlefield-Tested Technology, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 25, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/nov/25/business/la-fi-raytheon-sheriff-20111125.
163. See Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 802–04 (1971); Hill v. Scott, 349 F.3d 1068, 1074
(8th Cir. 2003); Brown v. Patterson, 823 F.2d 167, 169 (7th Cir. 1987); Johnson v. Miller, 680
F.2d 39, 42 (7th Cir. 1982).
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A. Protecting a Constitutional Right
As cases like Rivera and Smith illustrate, the out-of-date
standard set forth in West simply creates the unacceptable risk of
infringing on innocent people’s liberties and leaving them with no
relief. If an arrest warrant contains either a correct name or sufficient
physical description of the actual subject, police officers may
properly execute the warrant but wrongfully arrest an innocent
person, and still have probable cause under the Fourth
Amendment.163 Moreover, even when such victims are subsequently
detained and denied due process, the Fourteenth Amendment bars
relief unless the law enforcement agency has reason to know the
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individual is being wrongfully detained164 or engages in a custom of
deliberate indifference toward the detainee’s due process rights.165
The arrest of an innocent person also has serious consequences
from a systemic perspective and can jeopardize the safety of society.
When mistaken identity victims are arrested and detained, the
warrant is deactivated and the actual subject remains at large.166 As a
result, all law enforcement agencies are notified that the warrant has
been executed and are erroneously led to presume that the suspect
named in the warrant has been apprehended, thereby discontinuing
any efforts to arrest the guilty person.167 Because arresting officers
are under no duty to investigate claims of innocence once the warrant
is executed,168 the actual subject remains free until the error is
eventually discovered.169
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164. See Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145–46 (1979); Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250
F.3d 668, 683 (9th Cir. 2001); Rivera v. County of Los Angeles, No. CV 10-1861, 2011 WL
2650006, at *11 (C.D. Cal. July 5, 2011).
165. See Lee, 250 F.3d at 681–82; Rivera, 2011 WL 2650006, at *14.
166. Steve Rothlein, Mistaken Identity Warrant Arrests, LEGAL & LIABILITY RISK MGMT.
INST., http://www.llrmi.com/articles/legal_update/mistaken_identity_arrests.shtml (last visited
Sept. 21, 2013).
167. Id.
168. See Baker, 443 U.S. at 145–46; Lee, 250 F.3d at 683; Rivera, 2011 WL 2650006, at *11.
169. Rothlein, supra note 166.
170. Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System, supra note 148.
171. Smith v. County of Los Angeles, No. CV 11-10666, slip. op. at 2 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 11,
2012).
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B. A Minimal Burden
Given
the
substantial
investment
and
nationwide
synchronization of the use of biometric identifiers in the last
decade,170 the burden on law enforcement agencies to name the
subject of an arrest warrant by biometric identifiers and on
magistrates to issue the arrest warrant with such identifiers is
minimal. Any individual who has been arrested and booked has also
been fingerprinted and assigned a SID and/or FBI biometric
identifier.171 Thus, law enforcement agencies across the country can
access III, run the name through IAFIS, and determine whether the
subject of the arrest warrant has a SID or FBI number to be included
on the warrant.
Inevitably there will be some subjects with no criminal history
and thus no assigned biometric identifier. In the event that an
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individual is wrongfully arrested on a warrant without a biometric
identifier, law enforcement agencies should be required, as they
would for any reissued warrant following a wrongful arrest, to
reissue the warrant with the wrongfully arrested individual’s
biometric identifier, indicating that that individual has been
exonerated. Then, any officer executing the warrant would know to
run the exonerated individual’s biometric identifier in the warrant
database and similarly match that identifying information against the
arrestee’s before making an arrest.
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C. Executing the Warrant and Determining Probable Cause
Practically speaking, the use of biometric identifiers would place
a greater responsibility on law enforcement officials executing an
arrest warrant. No longer could an officer simply match the name on
the warrant to the name of the arrestee and obtain probable cause to
arrest. The inclusion of biometric identifiers would require the
officer to look up the biometric identification number in the warrant
database, examine the person’s profile and identifying information,
and only then make a determination that the arrestee is, in fact, the
person described in the warrant. If the officer’s patrol car is outfitted
with a police computer, the biometric identifier would pull up the
associated mug shot of the actual subject, as well.172
Requiring the use of biometric identifiers would also
systemically create a uniform standard for executing arrest warrants
and better equip courts to engage in a Fourth Amendment probable
cause analysis. Too often, courts are forced to engage in an objective
analysis of an officer’s good-faith reasonableness, a process that
results in unfair deference to law enforcement at the expense of
individual liberties.173 By requiring the use of biometric identifiers,
the arresting officer could properly execute the warrant only if there
was probable cause that the identifying information the biometric
identifier revealed matched that of the arrestee.
While the use of identifiers would greatly assist arresting
officers in their determination of probable cause, it would not
completely eliminate the possibility of wrongful incarceration. There
will inevitably be incidents where the officer errs in comparing the
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information, sufficient similarity exists to support a finding of
probable cause, or the charge is one of such a serious nature that
minor discrepancies will not justify the individual’s release.
However, in these situations, the innocent individual would still be
released immediately after he or she is booked, as a fingerprint
comparison through IAFIS would either pull up a different biometric
identification number than the one listed on the warrant or generate a
new identifier for the individual.174 No longer would individuals such
as Rivera and Smith be subject to prolonged detention, since the
actual subject’s biometric identifier would be immediately accessible
and subject to comparison.
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See Smith, No. CV 11-10666, slip. op. at 2.
See Faturechi & Leonard, supra note 6.
See supra Part III.A.
Biometric Authentication: What Method Works Best?, supra note 10.
Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System, supra note 148.
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V. CONCLUSION
In a country with an ever-increasing population, the arrest
warrant particularity standard set down 119 years ago in West v.
Cabell simply does not accurately account for the number of
individuals an arrest warrant can currently describe.175 Court
enforcement only compounds this problem. If an arrest warrant
satisfies West, courts frequently defer to the discretion of law
enforcement and presume that the arresting officer had probable
cause to execute the warrant in light of its apparent validity.176 Given
the current lack of recourse and difficult standards of proof by which
mistaken identity victims must make a civil rights violation, the most
reasonable solution is a revision of the particularity standard set
down in West. While it may have been reasonable to think that a
name or physical description could singularly identify the subject of
an arrest warrant in 1894, it is no longer a reasonable interpretation
of the Fourth Amendment’s warrant particularity requirement when
considering the exponential increase in total population and the
growing number of wrongful incarcerations.
Given the infallible nature of fingerprinting for purposes of
personal identification,177 and nationwide access to IAFIS,178
requiring officers and magistrates to issue arrest warrants with
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biometric identifiers would greatly minimize future unlawful arrests,
and at a minimal burden to law enforcement agencies. As such, the
Supreme Court should acknowledge this out-of-date standard and
revise the level of specificity for describing a subject of an arrest
warrant to include biometric identifiers, thus reaffirming people’s
enumerated right to be secure in their person and free from wrongful
incarceration.
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